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Abstract
Farm animal welfare is the main driver of nowadays criticism on German livestock
sector. At the same time, non market actors more and more are key actors within
animal welfare politics. Hence, we investigate political power of stakeholder
organizations in German livestock policy.
Our network based framework consists of two components: First, actors influence
policy decisions through informational lobbying. Informational lobbying refers to
providing expert knowledge in order to influence decision makers’ policy beliefs.
Second, the exchange of influence resources and power allows interest groups to
influence the policy positions of political agents. We combine both measurements
with the Banzhaf power index in order to quantify the power of both, political
agents as well as interest groups. How this power affects animal welfare policy
is illustrated in the field of piglet castration.
Results imply that the agricultural sector as well as animal protection groups
have the highest influence on beliefs and that state actors distribute most of the
power to the agribusiness sector. This structures leads to a positive evaluation
of surgical castration under anaesthesia. On the other hand, immunocastration
is evaluated as rather useless. This implies that participatory processes decrease
the procedures acceptance.
Keywords: communicational lobbying, political support, stakeholder influence, farm
animal welfare
Acknowledgement
We thank the participants of the TWFW PhD Workshop 2019 for critical comments and
feedback.
1. Introduction
The German livestock production is perceived negatively by the public (Grossarth, 2014;
Kayser et al., 2011; Rovers et al., 2018; Salamon et al., 2014; Zander et al., 2013). This
applies especially for the pig production (Rovers et al., 2017, 2019). The acceptance
problem is due to a lack of farm animal welfare (WBA, 2015) which is an issue of increasing
importance in developed countries (Cornish et al., 2016). So it’s not a surprise that
German citizens state higher demand for farm animal products (BMEL, 2017a, 2018). To
satisfy this demand, appropriate political processes have to be implemented.
Unfortunately, there seems to be a lack of political science knowledge about the pro-
cesses in the field of German livestock and farm animal welfare (FAW) politics (see WBA,
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2015). Few empirical studies focus on the issue. At the state level, the party difference
hypothesis seems to be confirmed. Especially governments with green party included fo-
cus on the topic animal protection (Vogeler, 2017b). The party serves as driver for animal
protection improvements. This is in the line with the findings of Ewert et al. (2018), who
show that coalition agreements with green participation are more assigned towards mul-
tifunctionality positions in agricultural politics. Parties matter at the national level, too.
Above all, the green party stresses farm animal welfare policies (Vogeler, 2017a). More-
over, the level of social concerns regarding animal welfare determines parties agendas:
In Germany (and United Kingdom) “ the high level of public concern for farm animal
welfare is taken up by all major political parties” (Vogeler, 2019a, p. 329). But voting
for parties is not the only way to participate on political processes and influence the de-
cisions. Moreover, members of the society influence policies through organized interest
groups (Becker, 1983). These interest groups consist of people of same profession, age or
concerns (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). In general, they have a higher knowledge about
certain single issues than outstanding people. Since they provide this knowledge and use
it as influence resource (Henning et al., 2019), governments benefit from it. Accordingly,
in general stakeholder organizations more and more serve in political advisory commit-
tees in Germany (Hustedt et al., 2010). Hence, the national strategy for farm animal
husbandry (BMEL, 2017b) also includes stakeholder participation as a way towards a
widely accepted livestock production. Thereby the government follows recommendations
of WBA (2015).
Indeed, power of non-state actors increases. Market actors seem to take over FAW
policy, for example through implementing (voluntary) labels. Maciel and Bock (2013)
states that beside offering opportunities for participation of non-state actors this kind
of governance also empowers food retailers to act as food regulators. In Germany state
actors retire from steering (Vogeler, 2019b). Civil society organizations (CSO) call for
better standards and use campaigns to draw attention to the topic and thus to increase
the pressure. For example, a legal opinion on behalf of Greenpeace stated that the pig
husbandry standards in Germany are not only against the animal protection law, but also
violate the German constitution (Greenpeace, 2017). This NGO also conducts campaigns
and protest actions (WELT.de, 2018). Beside activism, some animal protection groups
work together with the agribusiness sector to develop standards for labels like Deutscher
Tierschutzbund (o.J.). Beside the mentioned advisory committees or private initiatives,
the role of (informal) policy networks can not be neglected for German politics (see
Pappi et al., 1995). There is empirical evidence for the important role of stakeholder
policy networks in common agricultural policy (CAP) of the European Union (Pappi and
Henning, 1999; Henning, 2009). Since FAW is a subfield of agricultural policy, there is
good reason to assume that networks occur among livestock policy stakeholders.
Previous studies on animal welfare policy stakeholders have focused primarily on at-
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titudes and/or evaluation of different animal welfare indicators (see for example Heleski
et al., 2006; Heise and Theuvsen, 2017; Verberke, 2009). To our best knowledge, there
exist no study that investigates the role of communicational and classical lobbying1 in
German FAW politics. Thus, we know nothing about the effect of such network struc-
tures among the most relevant stakeholder organizations. This raises our first question:
To what extend is German farm animal welfare politics affected by stakeholder participa-
tion? We answer this question by using a framework of stakeholder participation based
on previous theoretical and empirical work on European CAP (Pappi and Henning, 1999;
Henning, 2000, 2009) and implementing development policies in African countries (Stark,
2017; Henning and Krampe, 2018; Henning et al., 2019). Beyond pure description of
network effects, we also want to illustrate the effect by investigating the case of piglet
castration.
Despite this diagnosis of a retiring state in the case of FAW (Vogeler, 2019b), some
issues especially of legal nature remain in the area of state. This is the case for piglet
castration. One aspect of FAW is “Good health” of animals, which includes absence
of pain caused by management procedures (Welfare Quality R©, 2009). Such a painful
management procedure is the castration of male piglets without anaesthesia. Castration
is performed in order to avoid bad smelling boar odor of meat from male pigs. In Germany
the common practice is to castrate male piglets until the age of seven days without
narcotise them. Back in 2012, a change of the Animal Welfare Act prohibited the piglet
castration without anaesthesia from 2019 on (Jahn, 2013). But due to uncertainty about
acceptance of the alternatives, German parliament extended the deadline for withdrawal
from this procedure for two more years (Grunenberg, 2018). The alternatives in question
are surgical castration under anaesthesia, immunocastration and boar mast. The first
procedure may be performed under full (inhalation or injection) or local anaesthesia (Zöls,
2006, pp. 26-31). Of course it is still a surgical operation. In contrast, immunocastration
suppresses the production of the sex hormones responsible for boar taint. The procedure
consists of two injections, performed at intervals of at least four weeks. The second
vaccination must be given between four and six weeks before slaughter (Candek-Potokar
et al., 2015, see). Moreover, scientists recommend this method since it causes less stress
for the animals (FLI, 2018). The third alternative requires neither surgical operation
nor vaccinations. Instead, boars are fattened to a lower carcass weight than usual and
thus are slaughtered earlier. Screening and sorting of carcasses during slaughter process
is required here (Candek-Potokar et al., 2015). The question remains, how stakeholder
participation affects the final evaluation of these alternatives and thus contributes to a
final decision for or against a certain alternative. Thus, our second research question is:
Which castration alternative is preferred at the end of a participatory process?
1Please note that own previous work only considered communicational influence using an unweighted
network (Grunenberg, 2018).
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To answer both questions, we proceed as follows. The next section provides a simple
theoretical framework of stakeholder organizations’ participation in political processes.
Afterwards the data we use to apply the mentioned framework are described. We present
the results of our analysis in the fourth section and complete with a conclusion in section
five.
2. Theoretical Framework
We use a simple framework of stakeholder participation. As can be easily seen in figure
1, stakeholder involvement (rectangle with dashed green line) consists of two interaction
channels between interest groups (set Q) and political agents (set G). Both types of actors
are rational actors who want to maximize their utility. Particularly, interest groups are
formed by people to archive goals (Olson, 1965; Becker, 1983) and therefore interested
in power (Grossman and Helpman, 1996). Parties want to be (re)elected in order to get
benefits from the governmental offices (Downs, 1957).
Figure 1: Framework
Interest 
Groups Political Agents 
Communication 
Power 
Lobbying 
Policy 
* 
 
MC 
MS 
Stakeholder Involvement 
𝑓(𝜙, 𝛾0) 
Source: Own Presentation.
The first interaction channel is communication (Henning et al., 2019). Interest groups
provide expert knowledge to the political agents and vice versa. Moreover, political agents
may also share knowledge among each other. This also applies for interest groups. Ac-
cording the model of belief formation described by Henning and Hedtrich (2018), commu-
nication affects actors’ policy beliefs. Thus, this mechanism influences the mental models
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actors have about the political technology that links policy x to outcome z. The belief
formation model follows the logic of Acemoglu and Ozdaglar (2010), who state that social
structure in which an actor is embedded in plays a role in belief formation. Thus one can
think of a communication policy network among a set N of n actors, where N = {Q,G}.
MC is the n×n adjacency matrix of this communication network where element mcij > 0
corresponds to a communication tie, i.e. i sends information to j. Let M¯C denote the
row stochastic transpose of MC . Given own-control, i.e. the extent that an actors own
knowledge determines his beliefs, network multiplier matrix can be calculated:
MˆC = [I − (1−mCdiagM¯C)]−1 ×mCdiag (1)
where mCdiag denotes own control and mˆij is the effect of j’s initial on i’s final belief. Please
note that this model corresponds to the model of Friedkin and Johnsen (1990).
Note that Grossman and Helpman (1996) name provision of information for politicians
as an influence resource beyond classical lobbying. This information not necessarily serve
only self-interest, but may also be objective expert knowledge serving the welfare of all
members of society (Ball, 1995). Thus, one can distinguish between the process of com-
munication and lobbying. The latter is the exchange of political influence resources and
power between interest groups and political agents (Pappi and Henning, 1998; Henning,
2000, 2009). This exchange game also takes place in a social network where MS is the
n × n adjacency matrix and mSij = 1 denotes the provision of political support by i to
agent j. Given the corresponding column stochastic adjacency matrix M¯S and the interest
in support Xdiag,
MˆS = [I − (sk)diag[I − (1− sk)diagM¯S]−1M¯SXdiag]−1 (2)
is the network multiplier matrix where mˆsij equals the power outflow from j to i. Please
note that broker share sk integrates direct and indirect power flows since it takes indirect
connections into account (i→ k → j).
Both, communicational and classical lobbying, lead to (total) power of stakeholder
organizations. Given the original voting power Φ of legislative actors, equation 3 gives
the power resulting from lobbying.
ΦLi = MˆSΦ (3)
Moreover, communication strengths this power, i.e. we sum up the influence of actor j on
belief formation of other actors to get the total power (see equation 4)
ΦTj =
∑
i
mˆCijΦLi (4)
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As mentioned in figure 1, the final policy is the result of a function of actors’ initial posi-
tions γ0 and power. This function corresponds to the mean voter decision rule (Henning
and Krampe, 2018):
γ∗ =
∑
j
ΦTj γ0j (5)
This framework was applied to the data described in the next section.
3. Data
We use the data of an survey among German livestock policy stakeholder organizations.
Organizations’ representatives were interviewed between September 2017 and October
2018. Please note that at the beginning of every interview interviewers emphasized that
they asked not for the interview partners’ personal opinion. Moreover, interviewers asked
them to state the position of their organization. Based on desk research we identified
more than 100 relevant stakeholder organizations. Because of time and resource limits
it was not possible to interview all of them. So after the first rounds of interviews, the
intermediate results of a reputation network have been used to filter out the unimportant
actors. Finally 37 interviews have been carried out. Note that since one organization did
not completed the interview, we have a data set of 36 actors. Average interview duration
was 1.5 hours.
3.1. Network Data
According to the theoretical framework, not only parliamentary groups and public ad-
ministration agencies, but also interest groups form the set of interviewed organizations.
Beside political profile and the measuring of FAW, the questionnaire contains policy pref-
erences and elite networks. Within the latter, the representatives had to mark all orga-
nizations they perceive as important to livestock politics. This reputation network was
used to set up network boundaries as mentioned above. Our networks of interest are the
expert communication network as well as the political support network. Following an
established approach, both were asked from two perspectives to get confirmed networks
(see Pappi et al., 1995).
To get the confirmed weighted communication Network MC , three questions had to be
answered:
QC1: “From whom do you receive expert information regarding livestock?”
QC2: “To whom do you send expert information regarding livestock?”
QC3: “Information of which organization are especially valuable?”
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QC1 refers to the perspective as knowledge receiver from other organizations, while QC2
asks for whom the organization serves as knowledge provider. Finally, the organization’s
representatives had to evaluate the marked organizations in QC1 with respect to the value
of information (QC3). Thus, elements ofMC can be one of three values: If mCij = 0, there
is no communication tie between actors i and j where mCij = 1 indicates that i sends
information to j. If mCij = 2, j perceives knowledge provided by i as especially valuable.
For the political support network, questions differ depending on the type of stakeholder
organization:
QP1 “Which political actors do you support?”
QP2 “From which organizations do you receive political support?”
If an actor is an interest group, the question asked corresponds to QP1. In contrast,
political agents had to answer QP2. Since we take indirect support into account (equa-
tion 2), we allowed the interest groups to mark other interest groups. Moreover, we
allowed political agents to support other political agents. Finally, if mSij = 1 i supports
actor j.
3.2. Policy Variables
Table 1: Policy Variables
Policy Variable
Surgical Castration with Anaestehsia POLDESIGN_manCastration
Immunocastration POLDESIGN_manImmunocastration
Boar Mast POLDESIGN_manMast
Source: Own Presentation.
To investigate the effects on the piglet castration debate, we use three variables cor-
responding the three castration alternatives mentioned above. In particular, stakeholder
organizations evaluated each alternative with regard to how useful they perceive the pro-
cedure. Corresponding variables are presented in table 1. The scale ranges from -2 (not
useful at all) to +2 (very useful).
Moreover, we use the Banzhaf-Index (Banzhaf, 1965) as original political power. We
calculate the index for all parliamentary groups of the German Bundestag based on the
amount of votes each group owns according election results from 2017. Formally, Banzhaf
power index of an actor g is the number of his critical votes divided by the sum off all
critical votes (equation 6).
Φg = Bg =
cg∑n
k=1 ck
(6)
A critical vote is actor g’s vote whose absence would make a winning coalition fail.
We present the results in the next section.
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4. Results
Since one of the 36 complete organizations was not named as influential, our networks
consist of 35 actors assigned to three sectors, two types and 11 groups as presented in
table 2.
Table 2: Actors in the networks
Sector Type Group n
StateActors polAgent ParlGroup 6
StateActors polAgent PubAdmin 3
StateActors intGroup Research 1
AgriBusiness intGroup Agric_Animal 7
AgriBusiness intGroup EcoAgric 2
AgriBusiness intGroup Egg_Milk 1
AgriBusiness intGroup Food 5
AgriBusiness intGroup Meat 3
CSO intGroup AniProt 3
CSO intGroup ConsProt 2
CSO intGroup EnvProt 2
Source: Own presentation.
4.1. Power Analysis
Calculation results of Banzhaf index are presented in table 3
Table 3: Power of parliamentary groups
ORG.SYS Φ
171003 0.392857
171007 0.178571
171001 0.107143
171006 0.107143
171005 0.107143
171002 0.107143
While the density of the communicational network is 0.266 (figure 2), the political
support network’s density is 0.085 (figure 3). Thus, 3.13 times more possible relations are
realised in order to exchange knowledge than in order to exschange influence ressources.
Based on this network structures we calculated the network multipliers. Figure 4 shows
the average multiplier effects at the group level. Please note that we normalized values
to external knowledge, i.e. cancelling out own control and presenting share of external
knowledge effects. It’s straightforward to conclude that the group of agriculture and ani-
mal production has a huge effect on other actor groups’ beliefs. More than 40 percent of
external knowledge effects of the food retailers are driven by producers as well as more
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Figure 2: Communication Network
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Figure 3: Political Support Network
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than 35 percent of meat group’s beliefs (figure 4). Moreover, agriculture and animal pro-
duction groups have the highest influence on the beliefs of parliamentary groups as well
as on research. Another key player is the group of animal protection which not only has
the highest influence on environmental protection, but also is second important for belief
updating of parliamentary groups (figure 4). Interestingly, we also see high influence pat-
terns of parliamentary groups. Thus, they not only receive information but also influence
policy beliefs especially of ecological agriculture (0.239), consumer protection (0.228) and
environmental protection (0.206) organizations.
Please not that we only present aggregated average support multiplier effects from par-
liamentary groups and public administration because there are no outflows from interest
groups. Results of the support multiplier identify three profiteers at the group level. 26.8
percent of the power outflows from parliamentary groups are assigned to food retail or-
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Figure 4: Grouped Communication Multiplier
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Source: Own Presentation.
ganizations (figure 5). Moreover, animal protection groups (0.229) as well as agriculture
and animal production (0.223) gain power from lobbying structure (figure 5). Public ad-
ministrations gives 0.3341 of control to agriculture and animal production. Additionally,
food retail (0.212) as well as meat interest groups (0.165) benefit from lobbying structure.
We already presented the original voting power in table 3 above. Note that original
power sums up to 1 (column “Phi” in figure 6) for the parliamentary groups. If we
apply calculation according equation 3 using support multiplier results, we notice a power
outflow from the parliament to an extend of 0.347 (figure 6, “Phi.L”). Through lobbying,
food retailers’ ΦL now is 0.096 while agriculture and animal production group has power
of 0.085. The third most powerful group is animal protection (figure 6, “Phi.L”). The
groups’ total power is presented in column “Phi.T” of figure 6: Here we clearly see that
communication patterns lead to an final power outflow from parliament to an extent
of 0.608. Moreover, agriculture and animal production organizations double their power
through communication and are now the most powerful actor. While food retailers’ power
doesn’t change compared to lobbying, communication results in animal protection groups
being the second most important stakeholder group (0.131) among the interest groups
(figure 6).
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Figure 5: Grouped Support Multiplier
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4.2. Policy Decisions
The sample means of the three castration variables are presented in table 4. As one
can easily see, all three alternatives are evaluated positive. Surgical castration performed
under anaesthesia is evaluated as most useful compared to boar mast and immunocasta-
tion. This evaluation pattern is driven by the relative importance of farm animal welfare
Table 4: Sample Means of Policy Variables
Variable Mean
POLDESIGN_manCastration 0.6
POLDESIGN_manImmunocastration 0.389
POLDESIGN_manMast 0.417
Source: Own presentation.
(Z.FAW) and producers’ welfare (Z.PRODUCER). As one can easily see in figure 7 as
well as in table 5, there is a positive correlation between the relative interest in farm
animal welfare and immunocastration. On the other hand, relation of relative interest in
producers’ welfare is negatively correlated with this castration procedure. We identified
the same patterns for boar mast. For surgical castration there is a positive relation with
interest in welfare of producers while correlation with Z.FAW is negative (table 5).
The final policy decision resulting from the power structure identified above shows that
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Figure 6: Power Measurements at Group Level
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Table 5: Correlation of Policies and Goals
Variable Z.FAW Z.PRODUCER
Z.FAW
Z.PRODUCER -0.345
POLDESIGN_manCastration -0.256 0.210
POLDESIGN_manImmunocastration 0.236 -0.198
POLDESIGN_manMast 0.327 -0.210
Source: Own presentation.
surgical castration is preferred (table 6). Moreover, one can easily see that boar mast
is evaluated as useful, too. The negative value of -0.112 for immunocastration implies
negative evaluation of this procedure (table 6). Thus, taking this final result surgical
castration seems to become the standard approach in Germany. Please note that this
relative order is in line with the sample means of initial positions (table 4). Moreover, it
is not affected by control decision rules that were applied (appendix 7, 7 and 8).
14
Figure 7: Comparison of Goals and Evaluation of Immunocastration
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5. Conclusion
Questions of farm animal welfare are challenging the public acceptance for German live-
stock production. Especially pig husbandry is facing much criticism. Since we know not
much about corresponding political processes, the power of stakeholder organizations is
unknown so far. Based on a framework of stakeholder participation including commu-
nication as well as lobbying structures we could contribute to the closing of this gap.
Particularly we answered two questions regarding the quantification of stakeholder power
and it’s effect in a recent animal welfare debate. First, our results show that the agri-
cultural sector as well as animal protection groups have the highest influence on beliefs
within the stakeholder network. Moreover, the state actors distribute most of the power
to the agribusiness sector, i.e. leading to power outflows of 60 percent from parliament
to interest groups. Second, this structures finally leads to positive evaluation of surgical
castration under anaesthesia. Immunocastration is evaluated as rather useless, i.e. par-
ticipatory processes decrease acceptance of that procedure. Moreover, we could show that
relative order of alternatives is not affected through certain scenarios. Main drivers of the
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Table 6: Final Policy Decision
Variable γ∗
POLDESIGN_manCastration 0.700
POLDESIGN_manImmunocastration -0.112
POLDESIGN_manMast 0.369
initial policy positions are the importance of farm animal welfare or producers’ welfare.
The positive evaluation of surgical castration performed under anaesthesia implies a
high likelihood for the procedure to become the standard approach in Germany. Indeed,
there are reasons that confirm this hypothesis. For example, surgical castration is already
standard in Danmark (Herrmann, 2018), a competitor in the market of pork. Moreover,
media report that there is pressure from German producer interest groups (Jücker, 2019).
Additionally, there is the approval for anaesthetic Isoflurane by federal agencies (Fritz,
2018) and allowance for farmers to anaesthetize on their own (topagrar.com, 2019).
From a farm animal welfare point of view, this result might imply a non optimal de-
cision. The procedure recommended by scientists is immunocastration, since burdens
for animals are comparatively low (FLI, 2018). Pain caused by the procedure is limited
only to the needle insertion for vaccine (Candek-Potokar et al., 2017). Moreover, after
the second injection immunocastrated pigs demonstrate less aggressive behaviour when
compared to same aged entire males (Rydhmer et al., 2010). While having a superior
performance compared to pigs castrated surgical and growing faster than entire males,
immunocastrates are less efficient in fattening. Thus, “[i]t is more economical to fatten
immunocastrates than SC; yet, production costs and carcass quality are less favourable
than that of EM” (Batorek et al., 2012). Despite advantages, German stakeholders prefer
the surgical castration as mentioned above. Moreover, this evaluation is driven by eco-
nomic concerns, i.e. the welfare of producers. Assuming that stakeholders know about
the benefit of immunocastration over surgically castrated pigs, the question remains why
the latter procedure is still preferred. Maybe the efforts of immunocastration overweight
the gains. As Rydhmer et al. (2010) point out, the timing of second vaccination’s appli-
cation matters. Immunocastration’s full effect is reached only from this point in time.
Thus, producers have to put on more efforts in finding the right point of time for apply-
ing vaccination, leading to a higher workload (Link, 2008). Nevertheless, the procedure
could be profitable at most farms over the long run: That costs of immunocastration are
compensated by the higher performance of the animals and their better feed conversion
(Verhaagh and Deblitz, 2019). All in all, the result of stakeholder participation is not
only a non optimal decision. Moreover, it might be a hint for biased beliefs. Here we see
need for future research.
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A. Appendix
Appendix 7: Control Scenarios
Variable γ# γ′
POLDESIGN_manCastration -0.669 0.648
POLDESIGN_manImmunocastration -0.118 -0.6
POLDESIGN_manMast -0.454 0.116
Source: Own presentation.
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